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Abstract
Developing systems that are assured to be secure requires
precise and accurate descriptions of specifications, designs,
implementations, and security properties. Formal specifi-
cation and verification have long been recognized as giv-
ing the highest degree of assurance. In this paper, we de-
scribe a software development process that integrates for-
mal verification and synthesis. We demonstrate this process
by developing assured sender and receiver C++ code for
a secure electronic mail system, Privacy Enhanced Mail.
We use higher-order logic for system-requirements speci-
fication, design specifications and design verification. We
use a combination of higher-order logic and category the-
ory and tools supporting these formalisms to refine specifi-
cations and synthesize code. Much of our work is applica-
ble to other secure email protocols, as our development is
parameterized, component-based, and reusable.
1. Introduction
Systems with security requirements typically must oper-
ate with a high degree of confidence; we must be able
to demonstrate that these systems satisfy security require-
ments in addition to functional requirements. Formal meth-
ods are useful in high assurance design and implementa-
tion of secure software systems [7, 4], because they increase
the clarity of requirements, identify hidden assumptions that
the system must operate on, and certify the consistency of
requirements and the correctness of designs, among other
benefits [13]. The challenge is to combine formal analy-
sis and code synthesis in a practical process acceptable to
software engineers.
In this paper we address the problem of building a secure
email system where the high-level security requirements are
accounted for in even the lowest level of implementation.
The particular secure email system we focus on is Privacy
This research was sponsored in part by Air Force Research Contracts
F30602-97-C-0310and F30602-98-1-0063and by the New York State
Center for Advanced Technology in Computer Applications and Software
Engineering.
Enhanced Mail (PEM) [12]. It is representative of other
email systems such as PGP [15] and NSA’s MISSI system
[3], and the methods we describe are applicable to those sys-
tems as well. We chose PEM because it has gone through
rigorous review as an Internet standard, it is publicly avail-
able, and it is similar to MISSI.
We apply formal methods to all key phases of the
software-development life cycle by integrating existing
tools: the higher-order logic theorem prover HOL [8] and
the synthesis tool SPECWARE which is based on higher-
order logic and category theory [14]. We formally specify
the system requirements, specify and verify the system de-
sign, perform stepwise refinement on the design specifica-
tions, and then compose these refinements to generate code
that is correct by construction.
In this work, higher-order logic is used for specification,
verification, and synthesis. Top-level security properties
and protocols are defined in HOL. The protocols are ver-
ified to satisfy the required security properties. The pro-
tocols are instantiated by adding specific data structures
and operations; these instantiations are verified to be cor-
rect within HOL. The verified design specifications are then
translated into SPECWAREspecifications. These specifica-
tions are refined to C++ code through stepwise refinements
and through the composition of these refinements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes our formal development process. Section 3 gives
an overview of PEM and the security services that it pro-
vides. Section 4 shows an example of how a security prop-
erty is defined and verified in HOL. Section 5 illustrates
how the highly assured design of the previous example is
refined into implementations. We conclude in Section 6.
2. High Assurance Development Pro-
cess
Highly assured systems can be built using a formal develop-
ment process. In any type of software development process,
there are at least four key stages: requirement analysis, de-
sign, implementation and verification. To produce highly
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assured software, we utilize formal support for each key
stage. We outline the proposed formal development process
next.
2.1. Formal development process
The ultimate goal of high-assurance system development is
producing code that satisfies desired properties. Accom-
plishing this goal requires two items: (1) correct system
specifications that satisfy the desired properties, and (2)
the valid refinement of specifications into code. To this
end, we employ a combination of higher-order logic and
category theory. Higher-order logic is used for verifica-
tion. Category theory provides the mechanism for refining
specifications into assured code and (more generally) for
component-based design and synthesis.
Analysis
Design
Formal definition of
performance, and 
Correct by construction
Implementation
through higher order
logic theorem prover
and model checker
Formal verification
Stepwise refinement,
Formal definition of
data structures,
operations
component-based
synthesis
required functionalities,
system properties
Figure 1. Software development process
Figure1 illustrates the development process. We add for-
mal support using higher-order logic for requirement anal-
ysis, design, implementation, and verification. The use of
higher-order logic allows us to relate the products of each
stage rigorously.
During the synthesis phase, we use stepwise refinements
from the verified design specifications to yield lower-level
specifications. These lower-level specifications are in turn
refined until we arrive at a specification that maps directly
to code.
Figure2 shows the steps involved in synthesis phase.
A design specification is typically composed from
smaller specifications. We refine each of the component
specifications using stepwise refinement and then compose
the individual refinements to arrive at an implementation
for the composite design specification. The decomposition
stepwise
refinement
Specifications
Design
Specifications
realization
ImplementationLow-Level
Figure 2. Synthesis phase
of a problem into smaller pieces is done by software engi-
neers; our process does not replace this part of the human
input. Because system specifications and refinements are
composed through basic specifications and refinements re-
spectively, this paradigm supports component based design
and synthesis.
2.2. Tools
The process is instantiated into a concrete process by using
specific tools.
We use the higher-order logic theorem prover HOL [8]
for system-requirements specification, system-design spec-
ification, and design verification. Higher-order logic pro-
vides a version of predicate calculus that allows variables
to range over functions and predicates. We choose HOL
because of its expressiveness, extensive libraries, open con-
struction, and strong typed implementation that lends itself
to being trustworthy.
We use Kestrel’s synthesis tool SPECWARE[14] for code
generation. SPECWARE is a tool that supports the de-
sign, development and automated synthesis of correct-by-
construction software. It is based on category theory, the
theory of algebraic specifications, refinements, and compo-
sition of refinements. We choose SPECWAREbecause of its
use of higher-order logic and categorical composition and
its code-generation capabilities.
Our formal development process does not limit our
choice to either HOL or SPECWARE. Any higher-order
logic theorem prover could be used in place of HOL. Like-
wise, a different synthesis tool based on category the-
ory and algebraic specifications could be substituted for
SPECWARE.
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-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
Content-Domain: RFC822
DEK-Info: DES-CBC,BFF968AA74691AC1
Originator-Certificate:
MIIBlTCCAScCAWUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwUTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxIDAeBgNV
......
Issuer-Certificate:
MIIB3DCCAUgCAQowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwTzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxIDAeBgNV
......
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,
UdFJR8u/TIGhfH65ieewe2lOW4tooa3vZCvVNGBZirf/7nrgzWDABz8w9NsXSexv
......
Recipient-ID-Asymmetric:
MFExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAwHgYDVQQKExdSU0EgRGF0YSBTZWN1cml0eSwgSW5j
......
Key-Info: RSA,
O6BS1ww9CTyHPtS3bMLD+L0hejdvX6Qv1HK2ds2sQPEaXhX8EhvVphHYTjwekdWv
......
qeWlj/YJ2Uf5ng9yznPbtD0mYloSwIuV9FRYx+gzY+8iXd/NQrXHfi6/MhPfPF3d
jIqCJAxvld2xgqQimUzoS1a4r7kQQ5c/Iua4LqKeq3ciFzEv/MbZhA==
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Figure 3. A sample PEM message
3. Overview of PEM
In this paper, we describe the application of our develop-
ment process to the development of a Privacy Enhanced
Mail (PEM) system. This system is representative of other
secure email systems such as PGP [15] and NSA’s Multi-
level Information Systems Security Initiative (MISSI) [3].
PEM adds privacy, source authentication, message in-
tegrity, and non-repudiation to plaintext email. It provides
end-to-end security, assuming the underlying communica-
tion network is insecure. It is documented in fourRe-
quest for Comments(RFC) documents: RFC 1421 [12]
describes message encryption, authentication procedures,
and formats; RFC 1422 [11] describes certificate-based key
management; RFC 1423 [1] describes algorithms; and RFC
1424 [10] describes key certification.
PEM supports several common security properties [2]:
privacy, the assurance to the sender and recipient that no
one but the intended recipient can read the message;u-
thentication, the assurance to the recipient of the sender’s
identity; integrity , the assurance to the recipient that the
message has not been altered since being transmitted by the
sender; andnon-repudiation, the assurance to the recipient
that she can prove to a third party that the sender was indeed
the originator of the message (i.e., the sender cannot deny
sending the message). We have previously defined all these
properties in higher-order logic [5, 6].
Figure 3 shows an example of a PEM message; each
message is encapsulated in a plaintext email message.
There are five types of PEM messages: (1)ENCRYPTED,
(2) MIC-CLEAR, (3) MIC-ONLY, (4) CRL, and (5)CRL-
RETRIEVAL-REQUEST. he type of a PEM message deter-
mines the structure of the message as well as the protocol
for processing the message. The format for each of these
messages varies slightly depending on whether public- or
secret-key cryptography is being used.
Each PEM message contains a header in addition to the
text message itself. The header contains several fields that
identify the message type and provide information about
the message and the cryptographic functions applied to the
message.
Among the header fields of interest is MIC-Info, the
message integrity field. MIC-Info provides information
necessary for checking the integrity of a message. This field
has three subfields: in order, they contain (1) the (name of
the) hash algorithm used to generate the message digest; (2)
the (name of the) algorithm used to sign or encrypt the di-
gest, depending on whether the protocol is using public-key
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or secret-key cryptography; and (3) the message integrity
code (MIC). The MIC functions like a secure checksum on
the message text.
For the remainder of this paper, we shall focus only on
the public-key variant of MIC-CLEAR messages, where the
message text is sent in the clear (i.e., unencrypted and un-
encoded) with its associated message integrity code.
The processes that senders use to create MIC-CLEAR
messages and that receivers use to check the integrity of
MIC-CLEAR messages are given by a security protocol.
Figure 4 shows the sequence of operations used to cre-
ate messages to send and to check the received messages.
For example, to create a MIC-CLEAR message, the sender
combines the plaintext message with the MIC, where the
MIC is the signed message digest of the mail-message con-
tent. To check the integrity of a MIC-CLEAR message, the
recipient must determine the appropriate hash and signature
verification algorithms to use, apply them to the message
text, and verify the result against the MIC. This security
protocol is concerned only with the sequence of operations,
not with the actual structure of messages.
message digesthash
algorithmplaintext
hash
algorithm False
True or
MIC
signer’s public key
message digest signature
algorithm
verification
signer’s private key
MIC
plaintext
algorithm
signing
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Figure 4. Protocol for message-integrity checking
In the next two sections, we describe how to design and
synthesize assured code for implementing the MIC-CLEAR
message structures and protocols.
4. Specification and Verification of
Message Integrity
In previous work, we formally specified the security prop-
erties desired by PEM using HOL theories [5]. We formally
specified mail message structures and operations for PEM
ENCRYPTED and MIC-CLEAR messages. We also for-
mally verified that PEM provides privacy, integrity, source
authentication and source non-repudiation. Because that
work provides a necessary input to the synthesis phase, we
reiterate the basis approach to specification and verification
in this section. We focus on the property of message in-
tegrity for MIC-CLEAR messages.
We use standard predicate calculus notation. The sym-
bols^;_; denoteand, or, and implication, respectively,
while 8 and9 denote theuniversalandexistential quanti-
fiers. The notationcond! t1jt2 denotes the conditionalif
cond then t1 else t2, and` t indicates that the formulat is
a theorem. Definitional extensions to HOL are denoted by
`de f.
4.1. Specification of MIC-CLEAR messages
A MIC-CLEAR message is specified simply as a tuple
hPkey;MIC-Info;Messagei comprising the sender’s pub-
lic key (Pkey), additional MIC information (MIC-Info),
and the message itself. In turn,MIC-Info is a tuple
hHash-ID;Sign-ID;MICi containing a hash-algorithm id, a
signing-algorithm id, and the MIC. This simplification re-
tains the essential information needed to retrieve a message
with security protection and is still complex enough to ex-
emplify component-based design and synthesis concepts.
The specification also defines accessor functions that
retrieve the values of the individual fields of a MIC-
CLEAR message, as well as selector functions that select
the hash function, the signature-generation function, and
the signature-verification function to be used. A portion
of the specification for MIC-CLEAR messages appears in
Figure5.
4.2. Generic integrity checking
Functionally, the integrity checking of mail messages is a
procedure that takes the message digest of a received mes-
sage and uses the sender’s public key to verify the received
MIC against the message digest. At this level of description,
the integrity check is independent of the message struc-
ture and thus can be specified by the following definition
in HOL:
`def 8verify hash message mic ekey.
is Intact verify hash message mic ekey=
verify (hash message) mic ekey
Intuitively, the predicateis Intactshould evaluate totrue
if and only if the transmitted and received messages are
deemed to be the same, according to the hash function. This
property holds under the following assumptions:
 The MIC field of the transmitted message is the en-
crypted message digest.
 The received MIC is the same as the transmitted MIC.
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
0-7695-0001-3/99 $10.00 (c) 1999 IEEE
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
4
Definitions:
get MIC hash`def 8x. getMIC hash x= FST(REPMIC info x)
get MIC sign`def 8x. getMIC sign x= FST(SND(REPMIC info x))
get MIC mic`def 8x. getMIC mic x= SND(SND(REPMIC info x))
MIC hashselect
`def 8x.
MIC hashselect x=
((get MIC hash x= RSAMD2)! fRSAMD2 j fRSAMD5)
MIC sign select
`def 8x.
MIC sign select x=
((get MIC sign x= DESEDE)
! sDESEDE
j ((get MIC sign x= DESECB)! sDESECBj sRSA))
(* retrieves MIC Info field from a MIC CLEAR message *)
get MIC Info
`def 8x. getMIC Info x= FST(SND x)
(* retrieves sender0s public key from a MIC CLEAR message *)
get public key
`def 8x. getpublic key x= FST x
(* retrieves plaintext message from a MIC  LEAR mesasge *)
get message
`def 8x. getmessage x= SND(SND x)
Theorems:
get MIC hashidCASES
` 8x. (get MIC hash x= RSAMD2) _ (get MIC hash x= RSAMD5)
get MIC signid CASES
` 8x.
(get MIC sign x= DESEDE)_
(get MIC sign x= DESECB)_
(get MIC sign x= RSA)
Figure 5. HOL specification for MIC-CLEAR messages
 The signature of a specific message can be verified
through the signer’s public keyekey.
The following correctness theorem shows that the in-
tegrity check satisfies the proceeding property. Note that
the assumptions appear as antecedents in the implication,
anddkeyrepresents the sender’s private key.
is Intact Correct=
` 8verify sign hash txmessage rxmessage
txmic rxmic ekey dkey.
(txmic= sign(hash txmessage) dkey)
(rxmic= txmic)
(8m1 m2. verify m1(sign m2 dkey) ekey
= (m1= m2))
((hash rxmessage= hash txmessage)
= is Intact verify hash rxmessage rxmic ekey)
This theorem is easily proved using the definition of
is Intactand the antecedents of the implication.
4.3. Integrity checking of MIC-CLEAR mes-
sages
To define message integrity checking for a particular mes-
sage structure, we instantiate the parameters in the preced-
ing generic integrity check with information contained in
the header of a particular message. We define accessor func-
tions to retrieve particular fields of a message and selector
functions to select cryptographic functions given algorithm
IDs. For example, the integrity checking function for MIC-
CLEAR messages is as follows:
`def MIC CLEARis Intact micclear msg=
let micInfo= get MIC Info mic clear msg
and ekey= get public key micclear msg
in
is Intact(MIC sign select micInfo)
(MIC hashselect micInfo)
(get message miclear msg)
(get MIC mic micInfo)
ekey
The integrity check for MIC-CLEAR message
(MIC CLEARis Intact) is verified to satisfy a simi-
lar correctness theorem as the generic integrity check
is Intact:
MIC CLEARis Intact Correct=
` 8mic clear msg txmessage txmic dkey.
let micInfo= get MIC Info mic clear msg
and ekey= get public key micclear msg
in
let hash= MIC hashselect micInfo
and verify= MIC verify select micInfo
and sign= MIC sign select micInfo
and rxmessage= get message miclear msg
and rxmic= get MIC mic micInfo
in
(txmic= sign(hash txmessage) dkey)
(rxmic= txmic)
(8m1 m2. verify m1(sign m2 dkey) ekey
= (m1= m2))
((hash rxmessage= hash txmessage)
= MIC CLEARis Intact micclear msg)
This theorem(MIC CLEARis Intact Correct) is iden-
tical to the general correctness theoremis Intact Correct,
except that (1) the received mail’s plaintext message con-
tent, the MIC, and the sender’s public key are retrieved from
the received MIC-CLEAR mail message(mic clear msg),
and (2) the hash function, and the signature generation and
verification functions are selected bases on the information
provided inmic clear msg.
This theorem is proved using the definition
MIC CLEARis Intactand the theoremis Intact Correct.
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
0-7695-0001-3/99 $10.00 (c) 1999 IEEE
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
5
HOL Specification SPECWARESpecification
Type constants:
algid 0
asymsignmic 0
MIC info 0
Term constants:
is MIC info (Prefix) :algid # algid # asymsignmic > bool
REPMIC info (Prefix)
:MIC info  > algid # algid # asymsignmic
MIC Info (Prefix)
:algid # algid # asymsignmic > MIC info
get MIC hash(Prefix) :MIC info  > algid
Definitions:
is MIC info
` 8x.
is MIC info x =
((FST x= RSA MD2) _ (FST x= RSA MD5)) ^
((FST(SND x)= DES EDE)_
(FST(SND x)= DES ECB)_
(FST(SND x)= RSA))
MIC info TY DEF
` 9rep. TYPEDEFINITION is MIC info rep
MIC info ISO DEF
` (8a. MIC Info (REPMIC info a)= a)^
(8r. is MIC info r = REPMIC info (MIC Info r) = r)
get MIC hash
` 8x. get MIC algid x= FST(REPMIC info x)
spec MIC_INFO is
sorts Algid, Asymsignmic, Temp_MIC, MIC_info
sort-axiom Temp_MIC = (Algid, Algid, Asymsignmic)
sort-axiom MIC_info = Temp_MIC | is_MIC_info?
% define is_MIC_info check
op is_MIC_info? : Temp_MIC -> Boolean
definition of is_MIC_info? is
axiom (iff (is_MIC_info? x)
(and (or (equal ((project 1) x) RSA_MD2)
(equal ((project 1) x) RSA_MD5))
(or (equal ((project 2) x) DES_EDE)
(or (equal ((project 2) x) DES_ECB)
(equal ((project 2) x) RSA)))))
end-definition
% define get_MIC_hash
op get_MIC_hash : MIC_info -> algid
definition of get_MIC_hash is
axiom (equal (get_MIC_hash x)
((project 1) ((relax is_MIC_info?) x)))
end-definition
...
end-spec
Figure 6. Comparison of HOL and SPECWARE specifications for MIC-Info
5. Synthesis of PEM MIC-CLEAR
Messages
Having verified that the specifications for (the design of) the
data structures and operations satisfy the required integrity
property, we turn to the synthesis phase of system develop-
ment. The previous analysis is legitimate for the final sys-
tem only if the synthesized code can be related formally to
the specifications. To this end, we specify the PEM system
in SPECWARE and then refine it to code. The HOL speci-
fication serves as a road map for the SPECWAREspecifica-
tion, as the two specifications are very similar. Figure6 il-
lustrates the syntactic similarity of the HOL and SPECWARE
specifications for the MIC-Info structure.
5.1. Theoretical basis of SPECWARE
The implementation phase relies on SPECWARE’s support
for both the composition of specifications and the refine-
ment of specifications into C++ code. These composi-
tion and refinement processes are based on categorical con-
structions involving categories of algebraic specifications.
Roughly speaking, aspecificationcomprises a signature
(i.e., a collection of sorts (or types) and a collection of oper-
ators over those sorts) and a collection of axioms over those
sorts [9]. Aspecification morphismbetween two specifica-
tions is a mapping between their signatures that preserves
theorems. Intuitively, a specification morphism fromA to
B indicates howA can be extended toB (equivalently, how
every model ofB can be viewed as a model ofA).
Whenever a specificationA can be extended to two dif-
ferent specificationsB andC, there is a canonical composite
specification that exhibits all the properties of bothB andC.
This specification can be obtained as a quotient of the dis-
joint union of the two specifications, where individual sorts
and operators ofB andC are unified exactly when they are
the extensions of the same sort or operator inA. This con-
struction is based on categorical pushouts (or, more gener-
ally, finite colimits).
Pushouts and other finite colimits form the basis for in-
stantiation of parameterized specifications. For example,
we can compose a specificationHASH for hash functions
with a specificationSIGN for signature-generation func-
tions to yield a specification for generating MICs on the
messages, as shown in Figure7. In this diagram, dotted
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lines represent element mappings, while solid lines repre-
sent specification morphisms. Thus the single sortE in
ONE SORT is mapped to bothmd in HASH andplaintext in
SIGN. As a result,mdandplaintextare identified as the sin-
gle sortmd1 in the resulting specificationSIGN HASH, as
evidenced by the types of the operatorshMD2andsRSA.
sorts:
   message
   md
operator:
   hMD2: message -> md
HASH
sorts: message, md, signature, private_key
operators:
   hMD2: message -> md
   sRSA: private_key -> md -> signature
SIGN_HASH
sorts:
   plaintext
   signature
   private_key
   sRSA:private_key -> plaintext -> signature
SIGN
operator:
sort:
   E
ONE_SORT
Figure 7. Composition of specifications for hash and for
digital signature
Refinement of specifications—the mechanism by which
code is synthesized— also occurs via colimits, in a category
of specifications andinterpretations. An interpretation from
A to B can be viewed as a specification morphism fromA
to a definitional extension ofB, which is a specification that
expandsB’s collection of sorts, operators, and axioms with-
out altering its collection of models.
These interpretations serve as refinements. For exam-
ple, suppose we have a source specification fortraffic light
that has one sortcolor, and three operators (or constants)
green, red andyellow. We can implementtraffic light us-
ing a pair of booleans through a mediating specification
color-as-bool-pair. In color-as-bool-pair we in-
troduce a new sortmed-colorwhose elements are defined in
terms of a subset of (the constructed) sortboolbool. We
then map the sortcolor to med-colorand the operators of
sortcolor to operators of sortmed-color. The interpretation
color-to-bool-pairis illustrated in Figure8; in this diagram,
dotted lines represent element mappings, and solid line rep-
resents isomorphic mapping for introducing new type.
Refinements can themselves be composed, in what are
termedsequential compositionsandparallel compositions.
Sequential composition can be viewed as transitivity of re-
finements: a refinement fromA to B can be composed with
1The selection of the (overloaded) named for the unified sort is a
design decision.
sort: color
operators:
         green
         red
         yellow
bool-pair
     sort: bool x bool
      operators:
          (T, T)
          (T, F)
          (F, T)
          (F, F)
sort: med-color
operators:
         med-green
         med-red
         med-yellow
traffic light
color-as-bool-pair
Figure 8. Interpretation color-to-bool-pair: implementa-
tion of color with a boolean pair
a refinement ofB to C to yield a refinement fromA to C.
Parallel composition is based on colimits of interpretations.
In particular, the refinement of a system obtained by com-
posing several components can be obtained by a parallel
composition of the individual components’ refinements. As
a result, a library of relatively small specifications can be
used to generate code for a large system: the small spec-
ifications can be composed to create a large specification
whose refinement into code is obtained by the composition
of the refinements of the small specifications.
5.2. Specification for PEM MIC-CLEAR
messages
During the specification process, we build specifications via
the composition of basic specifications.
We create a specificationSECURE MAIL to specify a mail
system with integrity protection (see Figure9). This spec-
spec SECURE_MAIL is
sorts Message, Md, Hash, MIC, Pkey, Verify
sort-axiom Hash = Message -> Md
sort-axiom Verify = (Pkey, Md, MIC)
-> boolean
op is_Intact : (Verify, Hash, Message,
MIC, Pkey) -> boolean
definition of is_Intact is
axiom (equal (is_Intact v h msg mic ekey)
(v ekey (h msg) mic))
end-definition
end-spec
Figure 9. SPECWARE specificationSECURE MAIL
ification does not impose any particular message structure
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MIC_CLEAR_w_SECURITY
   E
   F
   G
   ...
sorts:
SEVEN_SORTS
PEM_MIC_CLEAR
*
NOTE: 
   E
   F
   G
THREE_SORTS
  Pkey
  Md
  Hash = Message -> Md
  Message
  MIC
  Verify = (Pkey, MD, MIC) -> boolean
   is_Intact
   Message
   MIC_clear = (Pkey, MIC-Info, Message)
MIC_CLEAR
   Pkey
   Asymsignmic
   Algid
   Temp_MIC = (Algid, Algid, Asymsignmic)
   MIC-Info = Temp_MIC | is_MIC_info?
   is_MIC_info?
   get__MIC_hash
   get_MIC_verify
   get_MIC_mic
   ... (other accessor functions)
operator:
sorts:
sorts:
sorts:
operators:
*: unification of each sort in CRYPTO_SELECTION with the sort of 
Solid line with arrow: specification morphism
Dashed line with arrow: sort mapping between specifications
    the same name in MIC_CLEAR_w_SECURITY
*
SECURE_MAIL
  Pkey
  Md
  Hash = Message -> Md
  Message
  MIC
  Verify = (Pkey, MD, MIC) -> boolean
   Algid
   hash_select: Algid -> Hash
   verify_select: Algid -> Verify
operators:
sorts:
CRYPTO_SELECTION
   hRSA_MD2: Hash
   hRSA_MD5: Hash
   vDES_EDE: Verify
   vDES_ECB: Verify
   vRSA: Verify:
Figure 10. Specification for PEM MIC-CLEAR messages
on the mail; the integrity checkis Intact is independent of
message structures and protocols. We can reuse this spec-
ification for different mail systems with different message
structures.
We build a specification for PEM MIC-CLEAR mes-
sages by composingSECURE MAIL with following specifi-
cations:
 MIC CLEAR defines a PEM MIC-CLEAR message
structure, together with accessor functions that retrieve
the fields from mail messages.
 CRYPTO SELECTION defines types for hash functions,
signature-verification functions, and algorithm IDs,
and also defines selector functions that map algorithm
IDs to cryptographic functions.
The composition is shown in Figure10. In this figure, the
boxes represent individual specifications, while the solid ar-
rows represent specification morphisms. The dotted arrows
from THREE SORTS to MIC CLEAR and toSECURE MAIL in-
dicate the individual sort mappings of two specification
morphisms and illustrate how the sorts ofMIC CLEAR and
SECURE MAIL are unified.
The ultimate result of composing these specifications is
a specificationPEM MIC CLEAR for a PEM MIC-CLEAR
mail system with an integrity check. Replacing the spec-
ification MIC CLEAR in this composition with a specifi-
cation for a PEM ENCRYPTED message would yield a
specification for a PEM ENCRYPTED system with an
integrity check. Likewise, replacingMIC CLEAR with a
specification for a MISSI message structure and replacing
CRYPTO SELECTION with a MISSI specification for crypto-
graphic algorithms would yield a specification for a MISSI
implementation with an integrity check.
5.3. Refinement of specifications
To refine the composite specificationPEM MIC CLEAR, we
refine its components and then compose the resulting re-
finements. When the refinements become sufficiently low
level, SPECWARE supports the translation of the lowest-
level specifications into C++ code through the use of built-
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Figure 11. Refinement of composite specification
PEM MIC CLEAR
in theories. Figure11 sketches the refinement process; the
refinements (i.e., interpretations) appear as the vertical dou-
ble arrows.
A portion of the resulting code appears in Figure12.
6. Conclusions
The purpose of this work was to demonstrate an integrated
verification and synthesis process on an engineering appli-
cation. Higher-order logic bridges the two systems used for
verification and for synthesis; it is a useful intermediate lan-
guage for relating formal tools.
The automatically generated code was not as concise as
custom designed code. Nevertheless, it was assured code
that worked.
In constructing this system, we developed an algebraic
specification for each component of PEM. The use of ab-
stract data type helps partition the system into modules,
which should increase system maintainability. We have
benefited from the emphasis on modularity and composi-
tion: we were able to rebuild the system easily when com-
ponents were changed.
The formal specification and verification, together with
the use of component-based design, helped us identify a se-
cure core protocol that is common to many secure email
systems. Once the details of the mail-message structures
of different mail systems have been abstracted away, the
underlying core protocol appears the same. We are in the
process of formally specifying and implementing this core
protocol. We will (re)use the core protocol to specify and
synthesize both PEM and PGP formally and to relate these
two secure email systems.
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